Social Host and Pool Party Guest Not Negligent in Drowning Death of Voluntarily Intoxicated Adult

A New Jersey Appellate Court reversed the denial of summary judgment to defendants in a wrongful death case involving the accidental death of an intoxicated man at a residential pool party. In Delvalle v. Trino, a visibly intoxicated 26-year-old man drowned after jumping into a pool with a friend at a birthday party. While efforts were made to rescue him, resuscitation was ultimately unsuccessful. His parents, individually and as administrators of their son’s estate, filed suit against the owners of the home and their son (the “Trinos”), as well as several party attendees, including Kevin Garcia (“Garcia”) for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a Portee claim. The trial court denied summary judgment to the Trinos and Garcia on the basis that there were genuine issues of material facts in dispute with respect to their negligence. The Appellate Court reversed, finding that the trial court misapplied the law by denying summary judgment to defendants. Instead, the Court held, the trial court should have determined whether the defendants owed the decedent a statutory or common law duty as a matter of law.

The Trinos held an end of summer party at their home, to which their 21-year-old-son invited some friends and advised them that they could go swimming in the pool. He purchased alcohol for the party and his friends, even though some of them were underaged. The decedent, who was an experienced swimmer and was not underaged, became visibly intoxicated and entered the pool with a friend. She got out of the pool, but he did not. Garcia and another person attempted to rescue him by pulling him out of the pool and performing CPR, but the resuscitation efforts failed. Twenty-five minutes elapsed between the time the decedent was pulled from the pool and when 911 was called. Garcia left the party before emergency assistance arrived to take his underaged girlfriend away so that she would not be cited for underaged drinking. He returned within a half hour and spoke to the police about the incident.

Plaintiffs’ negligence allegations against Garcia focused mainly on his active role in the decedent’s death; namely, his failure to control the decedent’s drinking, his alleged “roughhousing” in the pool, and his failed rescue effort. In addition, plaintiffs also alleged that Garcia’s “flight” from the party constituted circumstantial evidence of his consciousness of guilt or liability for the drowning. Looking at the facts in a light most favorable for plaintiffs, the Court determined that plaintiffs failed to articulate a duty that Garcia breached that could make him liable for the death. The Court noted that, as a party guest, Garcia had no duty to restrict or control the decedent’s conduct at the party and that New Jersey law does not impose a civil tort duty of care on social guests to monitor the alcohol intake of another guest in the absence of a special relationship.

With respect to the “roughhousing” allegations that such activity caused the drowning, the Court found no facts to support plaintiffs’ claims. The Court addressed the failed rescue effort argument by finding that there were no facts or contentions that Garcia’s rescue efforts should not be afforded protection from civil liability under the Good Samaritan Act, as there was no indication that Garcia’s conduct was not in good faith. In dismissing plaintiffs’ argument regarding Garcia’s alleged “flight” from the party, the Court found that there was no record evidence demonstrating that Garcia temporarily left the scene because he believed he had any responsibility for the accidental drowning. For these reasons, the Court held that Garcia was entitled to summary judgment dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claims.

In addressing plaintiffs’ claims against the Trinos, the trial court’s analysis centered on what duty they may have owed to the people invited to their home, what protections would have been reasonable to implement to protect their guests, what statute may govern their actions, and the level of foreseeability regarding the risk to guests who were provided alcohol and given unrestricted access to a pool. The Appellate Court disagreed with this approach and pointed out that the identification of a legal duty was a question of law for the court to decide, not a fact finder, so genuine issues of material fact in dispute were not relevant to the legal analysis of duty.

Before analyzing the correct legal duties to impose on the Trinos, the Court turned to the Trinos’ argument that plaintiffs’ claims should be barred because the Social Host Liability Act (“SHLA”)—which is the exclusive civil remedy for imposing liability on them for serving alcohol to a guest that resulted in death—did not apply in this case. The Court agreed that the SHLA did not apply because it specifically addresses liability for bodily injuries arising from a car accident negligently caused by an intoxicated person. But, as the Court pointed out, no case law exists holding that a social host’s liability for serving alcohol to a guest is limited to claims under the SHLA to the exclusion of other negligence theories. The Court noted that since injury claims can arise out of negligent conduct related to intoxication outside of motor vehicle accidents, those claims can be entitled to relief if there was a breach of a duty of care that actually and proximately caused damages.

The Court then addressed the duties that plaintiffs claimed the Trinos owed the decedent; specifically, a common law duty of reasonable care in the conduct and supervision of their pool party activities. Looking at the laws of negligence, the Court noted that in determining whether a duty exists, the following four factors must be considered: the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.

The Court began its analysis by recognizing that any common law duty must satisfy an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy. Unlike a case where a social host provides alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest and then fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the guest from driving, there is no similar significant public concern involving a guest who drowns at a pool party due to voluntary intoxication. The Court noted that no case law suggests that a social host has a duty to prevent a voluntarily intoxicated adult guest from going swimming to safeguard the guest’s own well-being. Absent a dangerous condition of the pool that was unknown to the decedent that proximately caused his drowning, the Court held that the Trinos cannot be held liable for harm caused by a pool, which is an open and obvious danger. In this case, the Court held that there was no unknown condition that could serve to hold the Trinos liable.

Plaintiffs also claimed that the Trinos failed to provide a lifeguard and failed to timely rescue the decedent. The Court made short shrift of these arguments, finding that no statute, regulation or case law required the Trinos to provide a lifeguard at the party or prevent a guest from drinking and getting in the pool. The Court further found that plaintiffs failed to show that, prior to the individuals at the party performing CPR on the decedent, a delay in seeking assistance was a proximate cause of the death. With respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Portee claims, the Court held as a matter of law that plaintiffs failed to meet the prima facie requirements for either claim. For these reasons, the Court found that the Trinos were entitled to summary judgment in their favor on all causes of action.

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