In Castano v. Augustine, the New Jersey Appellate Division faced the legal question of whether a statute precluding intoxicated motor vehicle drivers from filing negligence actions applied to a situation where an allegedly intoxicated driver was neither charged with nor pleaded guilty to Driving While Intoxicated (‘DWI”). The statute, N.J.S.A.39:6A-4.5(b), states as follows: “Any person who is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, operating a motor vehicle in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50, [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a],[1] or a similar statute from any other jurisdiction, in connection with an accident, shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of the accident.” Holding that the plain language of the statute only barred plaintiffs convicted of DWI from bringing negligence suits and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s BAC at the time of the accident, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion.
At the trial court level, defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff’s post-accident blood test while being treated at the hospital revealed a likely BAC of 1.59 at the time of the accident and argued that under N.J.S.A.39:6A-4.5(b), plaintiff’s legal intoxication barred him from pursuing a negligence action as a matter of law. Defendants further argued that New Jersey’s strong policy of deterring drunk driving mandated that the statute should apply, even if the plaintiff was neither convicted, nor pleaded guilty to, DWI. Plaintiff argued that there was a genuine dispute as to whether plaintiff was legally intoxicated and, more importantly, that the statute did not apply because he did not plead guilty to and was not convicted of DWI.
On appeal, defendants reiterated their lower court arguments and maintained that the judge misapplied the law by interpreting a single phrase in the statute contrary to its “legislative intent, overall purpose, and public policy.” They also argued that the judge made a mistake in concluding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to plaintiff’s BAC at the time of the accident, which is “the sole criteria” for invoking the statutory bar to any claim for damages.
The Appellate Court rejected plaintiff’s arguments. Applying the well-known canons of statutory interpretation, the Court found the language of the law to be plain and unambiguous. The Court found that the statute evidenced a clear intent to bar a plaintiff convicted of DWI from filing suit and that the Legislature chose to limit this “draconian consequence” only to those plaintiffs who had actually been convicted of a DWI. While the Court recognized New Jersey’s strong policies against drunk driving, it held, based on prior precedent, that the law must be strictly construed to recognize that the Legislature does not use any unnecessary or meaningless language. To accept defendants’ interpretation would omit key words chosen by the Legislature to limit the reach of the statute.
With respect to defendants’ argument that no factual dispute existed as to plaintiffs BAC, the Court pointed to the record evidence and concluded that the trial court was correct in holding that there were genuine factual issues in dispute, which precluded summary judgment in defendants’ favor. The Court also noted that defendants’ argument supported its strict interpretation that the statute only denies a cause of action to plaintiffs already convicted of DWI. Since the statute only restricts those drivers who have been found guilty of DWI, the Legislature precluded the need for courts to resolve disputed facts regarding intoxication, as the plaintiff attempted to do in this case.
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